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Nepal adopted a unique post-conflict development framework for mobilizing 
international support and government resources to facilitate its peace process. The 
main focus of this paper is the role played by the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) 
in Nepal’s transition. The paper concludes that the main strengths of this model 
were its success in keeping ex-combatants in cantonments by creating a conducive 
environment, its harmonization of funds from donors and the government, and its 
contribution to national elections. However, the NPTF’s defects were many, including 
weak monitoring mechanisms, an inability to prepare for successful rehabilitation 
and to initiate projects to support transitional justice, and failure to stop the misuse 
of funds and corruption. Having taken stock of these failures, the paper explores a 
core reason for them: the NPTF’s isolation from the political process.
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Introduction
The decade-long armed conflict between Maoist rebels and the Nepalese state 
ended in 2006. After three rounds of unsuccessful negotiations, the democratic 
and rebel forces had come together following a coup led by King Gyanendra in 
2004. This led to a popular movement in April 2006 that ended a conflict that 
had claimed thirteen thousand lives. Subsequently, the seven major political 
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parties formed an interim government which was supported by the then rebels. 
The armed conflict formally ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Accord (CPA) in November 2006 between the rebel forces and the government of 
Nepal formed by the seven political parties. Following the ceasefire agreements 
between the government and rebels, both sides agreed to end hostilities and 
initiate social, political, and economic transformation within the country. Once 
the CPA was signed, the former rebels came into mainstream politics, joining 
the interim parliament on the basis of special provisions introduced into the 
constitution. Since then, the peace process has rested on four main pillars: (1) 
the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, (2) a new constitution and 
restructuring of the state, (3) reconstruction and post-conflict development, and 
(4) national and local reconciliation.
Believing that the regular development process was inadequate for 
addressing the specific post-conflict issues, the government set up the Ministry 
of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) and the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) 
in January 2007. This was considered a significant milestone in the process of 
transition that would facilitate a return to the normal course of development 
as quickly as possible. Since then, the NPTF has become the principal body 
linking the government of Nepal and donor agencies (interviews with NPTF 
technical adviser, June 26, 2013, and NPTF director, August 11, 2014).  Since 
the NPTF was formed to coordinate the administration of funding from 
donors and the government, its leadership is made up of political players from 
Nepal, representatives of the political bureaucracy of the donors, and its own 
bureaucrats. Despite corruption and accountability issues, as well as the political 
isolation of the NPTF framework, a significant proportion of NPTF resources 
has been allocated to the four pillars of the peace process noted above. When I 
speak of the NPTF’s “political isolation,” I do not mean that there has been no 
political involvement in the framework. Indeed, the NPTF board was composed 
of political leaders, but they have, most of the time, expressed their dissatisfaction 
with their exclusion from the actual decision-making process. The politicians 
claim that most of the key decision-making positions are occupied by technocrats 
and bureaucrats, and the political leaders are only brought in to rubber-stamp 
these decisions (interview with former NPTF board member from Nepali 
Congress Party, August 17, 2013). Thus, the dynamics between the different 
players and the context should be taken into consideration when examining how 
the NPTF framework operates and its contribution to the main pillars of the 
peace process.
The NPTF has sought to facilitate Nepal’s transition to peace by undertaking 
a variety of projects. Several of its initiatives designed to support the first three 
pillars have been successful, though seldom within the intended timeframe. The 
management of the ex-combatants is thought to have been relatively successful, 
but its completion missed multiple deadlines. However, the reconstruction of 
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infrastructure destroyed in the conflict has been less successful than the other 
key pillars. In many cases, reconstruction has deteriorated into a matter of kam 
chalau (make do with what you have) rather than being a planned process. 
The promulgation of a new constitution, a significant milestone in the peace 
process, was only recently achieved, and it is still disputed. The national and 
local reconciliation process has lagged behind the other three pillars. Eight years 
after the peace accord, the government was finally able to set up a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Two years later, the TRC has just set up its 
national headquarters, started to receive complaints, and is preparing to start its 
work, while its operational guidelines have yet to be formalized.
This paper focuses on analyzing the role of the NPTF as a special case of the 
facilitation of post-conflict development policies and practices adopted in Nepal 
in 2007. The paper is based on a review of the available literature and primary 
data acquired through semi-structured interviews. The author was given an 
opportunity to conduct more than 143 semi-structured interviews from July 2013 
to October 2015 with key informants and project beneficiaries associated with 
Nepal’s peace process. The interviewees ranged from top political leaders and 
officials involved in implementing various projects related to the peace process, 
to local political leaders, social workers, former combatants, project beneficiaries, 
and Nepalis who took no part in the conflict but were deeply affected by it. 
The next section of this paper provides an overview of the context in 
which the NPTF framework was set up, as well as an outline of the institutional 
arrangements made for the implementation of joint government-donor efforts. 
The following section focuses on the achievements of the NPTF framework and 
the challenges associated with it, including in such areas as the management of 
ex-combatants and cantonments, assistance for victims of the conflict, transitional 
justice, the process of drafting the constitution, and the governance system of 
the NPTF. Finally, the paper concludes that the work of the NPTF framework in 
bringing together the national government and international donors in resource 
mobilization had mixed results. 
Establishment of the NPTF Framework in Context
Developing countries such as Nepal receive foreign aid for many development 
projects every year. To properly manage and coordinate such aid, the government 
of Nepal established the International Economic Cooperation Coordination 
Division (IECCD) within the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance 2014). 
However, it is well documented that donors also invest directly in development 
projects, often without even coordinating their efforts with the IECCD (Nepal 
Dispatch 2013). Indeed, policy briefs regularly call for a one-window system for 
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channeling foreign aid (Spotlight 2012). The establishment of the NPTF must be 
understood in this context.
The Peace Secretariat, which was set up to deal with specific issues of post-
conflict transition, frequently raised the issue of weak coordination among 
government agencies themselves in setting priorities and managing resources 
(Peace Secretariat, Government of Nepal 2007; Crisis Group 2006; OECD Joint 
Evaluation Team 2013; United Nations Nepal Information Platform 2006). In 
addition, the issue of donor harmonization to avoid overlap in projects and 
financial assistance was always a major topic of discussion in joint meetings of 
donors and the government (NPTF 2010b; Peace Secretariat, Government of 
Nepal 2007). Most stakeholders realized that the regular coordination mechanism 
set up by the Ministry of Finance was not able to manage the massive influx of 
aid for the peace process. 
The general understanding as reflected in the national press at that time was 
that regular development practices could not ensure the peace dividend (Spotlight 
2012; Nepal Dispatch 2013; NPTF 2008). Two major risks were identified by the 
Ministry of Finance itself. First, it was feared that the donor community might 
not fully support regular endeavors. Second, there was concern that the existing 
line ministries might not take the management of international support for the 
peace process as seriously as was necessary (Ministry of Finance 2014). Therefore, 
it was in the interests of both the donors and the government to establish a 
separate mechanism with a joint basket fund. That was the context in which the 
Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF), housed within the MoPR, came into being in 
February 2007. The NPTF had a mandate to implement the CPA and subsequent 
agreements working under the MoPR. 
The NPTF describes itself as a unique and pioneering funding mechanism in 
the arena of peacebuilding managed by the government and supported by donors 
(NPTF 2010a; 2010b). Looking at peace funds globally, the United Nations has 
set up sixty-six multi-partner trust funds to support transition, development, 
and peace (UN Multi-partner Trust Fund Office 2015). Civil society groups have 
managed funds for peace through partnerships with multiple donors in Sri Lanka 
(Orjuela 2005), and the European Union is planning to set up a post-conflict 
peace fund as part of the Colombian peace process (European Parliament 2016). 
The NPTF is to date, therefore, the only multi-partner peace trust fund managed 
by a national government. 
Due to the protracted nature of the transition period in Nepal, the mandate 
of the NPTF was extended three times, in 2009, 2011, and 2014. As per the 
terms set out in the CPA, the NPTF is mandated to act as a coordinating body 
for peace-related initiatives, as a funding mechanism for government-donor 
resources, and to monitor and facilitate the peace process. In this regard, the core 
mandate of the NPTF is to implement the provisions of the historic CPA and 
subsequent agreements, thus establishing lasting peace in Nepal (NPTF 2014).
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Regarding the NPTF’s institutional arrangements, the government is one 
of the main funding partners, as well as being the manager and implementer 
of the post-conflict development projects. The Joint Financial Arrangement 
(NPTF 2010a) Agreement recognizes the role of donors in supporting the fund 
in such a way that it can be effective and accountable. The agreement states that 
donors have promised to assign a chair from their side and to provide technical 
and financial support. Similarly, political parties and civil society organizations 
are represented on the NPTF board, the institution’s highest decision-making 
and project-approving body. A technical committee, led by the secretary of the 
MoPR and composed of other bureaucrats, was set up to assist the board and 
approve concept notes. At the same time, the framework has identified victims of 
the conflict, the security sector, and peacebuilding mechanisms at national and 
local levels as beneficiaries. Until 2014, the NPTF was a platform for harnessing 
government funds supplemented by contributions from eight other partners, 
namely, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Today, only four international donors 
remain. The NPTF Secretariat was established for the day-to-day management of 
projects. For the organization of the NPTF, see Figure 1.
Figure 1. Organization of the NPTF
Source: Nepal Peace Trust Fund 2010b.
Notes: DG: Donors Group; EPSP: Emergency Peace Support Project of the World Bank; TC: 

























Donors, peace scholars, international experts, consultants, government 
officials, and civil society representatives have their own distinct priorities 
concerning the peace process in Nepal. Despite the fact that numerous 
consultations were required before an agreement could be reached, five key 
areas of peacebuilding which require special attention were identified as the 
targets of the NPTF’s work (NPTF 2008; NPTF 2010b). Those areas are: Maoist 
combatants in the cantonments; persons and communities affected by the 
conflict; the reconstruction of public infrastructure damaged during the conflict; 
the strengthening of law and order, including mechanisms for transitional justice; 
and the development of the new constitution. Based on those five thematic areas, 
four “clusters” were set up to carry out the day-to-day functions of the NPTF, 
focusing on the following areas: cantonment management and integration of 
combatants, conflict affected people and communities, security and transitional 
justice, and constituent assembly and peacebuilding initiatives.
NPTF Framework: Achievements and Challenges 
When the peace process started in Nepal, the NPTF framework was mandated 
to implement the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and all other subsequent 
agreements. It was envisaged that the NPTF would facilitate the whole peace 
process, creating a conducive environment for peace, executing peace-related 
projects, and monitoring those projects and the entire ongoing peace process 
in the country. The main task was the CPA, but after that was signed, the 
government started to conclude numerous, often contradictory, agreements with 
various armed groups, and that hampered the work of the NPTF by making it 
more complex. Indeed, between 2006 and the end of 2008, the number of small 
dissident groups in Nepal had reached 147. The restoration of democracy and 
the change of regime in the country caused chaos, and social movements raised 
various issues. For example, there are many ethnic and minority groups in Nepal 
who had long felt marginalized. They began organizing themselves into identity-
based groups and calling for inclusion in mainstream politics. Actually, most 
of the issues raised were directly or indirectly linked to provisions of the peace 
agreements. It is obvious that this was a very confusing time for the government 
and social bodies, and it was difficult for them to decide how they should act. At 
the same time, the government’s efforts to manage diverse dissident groups by 
means of dialogue and agreements led to the production of multiple contested, 
dichotomous, and complex documents. It would have been a very complex task to 
act on all of the clauses in those documents at once. Efforts to meet the demands 
of dissatisfied groups led to a situation where if some provisions of an agreement 
with one group were implemented, some clauses in agreements with other groups 
would be violated. This scenario created unprecedented difficulties for the NPTF. 
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It is in this context that I will examine the achievements of the NPTF and the 
challenges it has faced.
The NPTF has been active for eight years in Nepal. In answer to the question, 
“How is the NPTF doing?” the majority of respondents to surveys of beneficiaries 
and stakeholders of NPTF projects in 2014, conducted by the Kathmandu-based 
research and consultancy firm Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA), said it was 
performing “well” or “fairly well” (see Figure 2). 
As per its mandate, the NPTF has been preparing to close down on 
completion of its third extended term in 2017, but respondents to the 2014 
survey feel that it should continue until the many pending issues of the peace 
process are resolved. The majority of the respondents (78 percent) said that the 
NPTF is still needed for the longer term, and they also suggested that the NPTF 
framework should focus on three main areas, namely: support for transitional 
justice mechanisms; support for genuine, rather than fake, victims of conflict; and 
reconstruction of the physical infrastructure. 
Below, I have noted some key achievements of the NPTF framework over its 
eight years of existence, as well as some challenges it has faced, based on my field 
notes:
-The NPTF Secretariat in charge of managing and facilitating the peace process has 
played a positive role, particularly in managing arms and combatants.
-The NPTF was successful in creating a positive environment in the cantonments, 
where ex-combatants were held for more than six years. But it was less successful in 
Figure 2. Responses to the Question “How is the NPTF Doing?”
Source: Interdisciplinary Analysts (IDA) Survey 2014.






















rehabilitating combatants and preparing the communities that would receive them.
-The NPTF modality focused more on managing funds and offering technical support, 
and it was relatively successful in this. But it failed to stop corruption and the misuse 
of funds due to weak monitoring mechanisms.
-NPTF projects contributed to improving the quality of life of people living in the 
vicinity of the cantonments. Unfortunately, after the cantonments were closed down 
in 2012, most of the physical infrastructure was neglected.
-The NPTF was unable to initiate many projects to support the rehabilitation of 
people and communities affected by the conflict due to inaccurate lists of victims. No 
attempts were made to correct these lists.
-Support for transitional justice was the weakest area of the NPTF’s work, as 
transitional justice bodies were not set up until 2014 and they have yet to come into 
operation due to lack of political cooperation. 
-A major challenge for the NPTF was its isolation from the political process.
-The NPTF successfully fulfilled its role of supporting national elections, and elections 
were free and fair. But although the election process was successful, election-related 
projects were massively expensive.
-The NPTF achieved success in two major areas of its work: donor harmonization and 
the coordination of line ministries.
-The NPTF’s performance was sometimes weakened by differences between the 
priorities of donors and those of the government. 
Cantonment Management: The Legacy of NPTF Investment
Everybody needs to show that they are successful. For the NPTF, success is 
often directly associated with spending on material things. From the list of 
NPTF spending, it is obvious that the framework had very little involvement 
with intangible projects. This is not to imply that spending on cantonment 
management and materials, which helped to make ex-combatants’ lives much 
easier, was wrong. Management of cantonments and ex-combatants was clearly 
a success story for the NPTF and the entire peace process, but the NPTF did 
miss some opportunities to focus on intangibles, such as national healing and 
reconciliation between ex-combatants and the communities to which they 
returned. Here, I will focus on the NPTF’s success in managing cantonments 
over a long uncertain period, and at the same time I will point to some missed 
opportunities for real national healing through rehabilitation and reconciliation. 
Despite a number of challenges, the demobilization of the Maoist combatants 
contributed significantly to the conclusion of the peace process within a very 
difficult environment characterized by growing distrust among political parties 
and the unraveling of the consensus regarding Nepal’s political future. For this 
reason, the management of the cantonments and the ex-combatants housed 
in them is considered to be a relatively successful aspect of the NPTF’s work 
(interviews with former coordinator of the Secretariat for Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation of Maoist Army Combatants [SRRMAC], August 13, 2013, and 
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director of the NPTF, July 22, 2013). There is no doubt that it was very difficult 
to manage the thousands of ex-combatants for more than six years when they 
were initially supposed to be in the cantonments for only six months (interview 
with former coordinator of SRRMAC, August 15, 2013). The majority of ex-
combatants were kept in the cantonments (although a few hundred were kept 
outside to provide security for Maoist leaders) and all the logistic support was 
provided by the NPTF. 
In its management of the cantonments and ex-combatants, the NPTF 
spent its resources on access roads, physical infrastructure (temporary housing, 
containers, kitchens, etc.), the supply of utilities,  healthcare, solar power and 
biogas systems, secretarial services, and allowances for ex-combatants (semi-
structured interviews with two former combatants and an engineer formerly 
employed at the First Division Headquarters, Chulachuli, Ilam, who was living in 
the vicinity, August 9, 2013, and one former combatant from the Sixth Division 
Headquarters, Dasarathpur, Surkhet, living in the vicinity, August 1, 2013). All 
the projects associated with ex-combatants and cantonment management were 
completed by the end of 2014. According to the latest data made available by the 
NPTF, the total budget allocated for this “cluster” up to 2013 was NPR5,539.87 
million, which is 24 percent of its total budget (NPTF 2014).
The design and implementation of NPTF projects of this kind were always 
plagued by delays and uncertainty surrounding the reintegration process 
for ex-combatants. In the CPA, it was assumed that reintegration would be 
completed within six months. But in the end it took more than six years. In a 
2009 report, the Cantonment Management Office accepted the fact that the 
initial arrangements inside the cantonments were not satisfactory. The report 
mentions that government funds made available through the NPTF were barely 
enough to cover such basic necessities as food, shelter, and sanitation, as well 
as medical supplies for the ex-combatants. But according to ex-combatants 
themselves, conditions did improve as the cantonments remained in operation 
for longer than expected (semi-structured interviews with ex-combatants living 
near Seventh Division Headquarters, Kailali, January 10-11, 2015, and ex-
combatants living in Dang who had previously lived at Fifth Division Satellite 
and Headquarters, Rolpa, January 5-6, 2015). As one of the interviewees said, “We 
could not have continued with what was made available during our initial days in 
the cantonments, later the situation improved and we were comfortable.” 
In the IDA survey of ex-combatants, respondents admitted that the 
infrastructure and services, including allowances, were vital considering that they 
had to stay in the cantonments for more than six years (IDA 2013, 47). However, 
in the same survey, when 897 ex-combatants were asked to rate the statement, “The 
Secretariat has succeeded in effective integration and rehabilitation,” 22.7 percent 
answered “not at all,” 19.6 percent said “a little,” 34.6 percent said “to some extent,” 
11.4 percent said “quite a lot,” and 10.8 percent said “a lot” (IDA 2013). It is clear 
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from these findings that the majority of ex-combatants rated the work carried out 
by the Peace Fund Secretariat on their behalf as less than satisfactory. However, 
one former director of the NPTF claimed that it played a very effective role in the 
construction and maintenance of the physical infrastructure of the cantonment 
sites (interview with former director of the NPTF, July 22, 2013). 
The NPTF was largely ineffective in providing the vocational and/or other 
training required to prepare ex-combatants and the receiving communities for 
reintegration/rehabilitation (semi-structured interviews with ex-combatants 
living near Seventh Division Headquarters, Kailali, January 10-11, 2015, and with 
ex-combatants in Dang from Fifth Division Satellite and Headquarters, Rolpa, 
January 5-6, 2015). One combatant currently living in Maharajganj, Kathmandu, 
who had opted for a voluntary retirement package at the time of discharge from 
Third Division Headquarters, said, “The majority of the ex-combatants who 
opted for voluntary retirement were sent back to their communities without any 
skills development training” (interview, December 12, 2014). 
Only one project, out of twenty-two in total supported by the NPTF, 
was found to provide skills (NPTF 2014). But that project was for only six ex-
combatants who opted for rehabilitation at the time of their discharge. It is 
evident that there was no program to prepare either the receiving communities 
or the ex-combatants for their return. Most of the ex-combatants bitterly 
complained that although they were given a handful of cash by way of a “golden 
handshake,” they were not told how to manage their money. One former rank-
and-file combatant in Kanchanpur District said, “I joined the insurgency at the 
age of twelve when I was in class nine. I do not know how to manage money or 
run a business. They gave me half a million rupees but did not tell me what to 
do with it. Half of my money was spent in the first month while I was looking 
for a possible small business. I didn’t know what I could do with the rest of the 
money. I was confused and bought a piece of land” (semi-structured interview, 
January 11, 2015, at a restaurant at Attariya bus station, Kailali). Most of the ex-
combatants had joined the rebel forces as teenagers, not having completed high 
school.  At the time of their demobilization, they were still young and lacked the 
skills necessary for employment. It is clear that the NPTF missed the opportunity 
to prepare both ex-combatants and the receiving communities for successful 
rehabilitation. 
Another weakness most of the interviewees reported was poor monitoring 
of the cantonments because government and international community 
representatives were denied access by the Maoist leaders. The NPTF focused 
its efforts on managing funds rather than offering technical support to improve 
conditions inside the cantonments. Meanwhile, government officials could 
not access the cantonments (interviews with the editor of a major Nepali 
national daily, July 28, 2013, and a former member of the Special Committee 
on Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Army Combatants, August 14, 
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2013). The weak monitoring mechanism created safe havens for corruption and 
mismanagement. Most of the ex-combatant interviewees blamed Maoist leaders 
and commanders for the corruption. The issue of corruption in the cantonment 
management process is considered the largest corruption scandal involving 
government-managed funds in the history of Nepal. The issue has been under 
investigation by the Commission on the Investigation of Abuse of Authority 
(CIAA) for the last three years. 
One former battalion commander from Third Division Headquarters, 
Chitawan, told how Maoist leaders had misused the Maoists’ pool fund 
(interview, February 17, 2015, Hetauda). He said that all the ex-combatants in the 
cantonments had agreed to create a pool fund to support disabled combatants 
and those adversely affected by the conflict. But the funds were misused in an 
institutionalized way which was very difficult to trace. The problem was often 
exacerbated by the monitoring authority. According to the interviewee, each 
ex-combatant agreed to donate NPR1,000 per month out of their allowance to 
support sick and disabled members of their armed group and the Maoist party. 
This practice continued until the cantonments were closed. The Maoist leadership 
never made the fund’s accounts public, and it is still a matter of debate in their 
central committee. Similarly, another ex-combatant from Sixth Division Satellite 
Cantonment at Lekparsa revealed another example of corruption inside the 
cantonment (interview, January 2, 2015, Surkhet). He recounted how Maoist 
commanders were assigned to take charge of construction works inside the 
cantonments so that NPTF funds could be transferred directly to them by the 
authorities. The commanders then got ex-combatants living in the cantonments 
to do the work for nothing. While this system worked in principle, and the 
monitoring committees found that the projects had been completed in a cost-
effective way, it gave the commanders an opportunity to exploit free labor and 
take a cut of the funding. This exacerbated combatants’ dissatisfaction with their 
own leaders and government agencies.
The NPTF’s management of the cantonments also had some unintended 
consequences. I observed some improvements in the quality of life of people 
living in the vicinity of the cantonment sites as well the inmates themselves. 
Access roads, electricity and water supplies, healthcare facilities, and other 
physical infrastructure has benefitted local villagers as well as ex-combatants. 
The establishment of cantonments also created opportunities for local people 
to initiate small-scale enterprises. Even after the combatants were discharged, 
local people were still benefiting from some of these developments. However, the 
government was unable to decide what to do with this infrastructure once the 
combatants had left, and much of it has been neglected.
Neglect and Isolation of Conflict Victims
The neglect and isolation of conflict victims was evident from the very beginning 
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of the data collection and documentation period. Now, after over a decade of 
peace, we still do not have an accurate list of conflict victims. The list compiled by 
government agencies is contested, as it is subject to political influence and cannot 
be trusted. The absence of locally elected representative bodies and the lack of 
any effective local bodies charged with looking after conflict victims meant that 
most “genuine” victims were isolated from the peace process and those entitled 
to relief and support were either completely neglected or given insufficient help. 
NPTF documents claim that the fund supported disabled ex-combatants and 
victims of the conflict by establishing physical rehabilitation centers. According to 
one recent NPTF report, the total budget for this kind of work was NPR1,064.83 
million, around 5 percent of its total budget (NPTF 2014). The NPTF project lists 
show that the fund focused on providing centers offering counseling and physical 
aids for amputees, especially those who had lost legs or hands. Exactly the same 
model was used to support conflict victims as was used for ex-combatants. But 
unlike the ex-combatants, the victims were not concentrated in one place, so 
this model was not suitable for them. This added to the challenges the NPTF 
encountered in reaching out to victims and providing them with services. Unlike 
in the case of the ex-combatants, the NPTF failed to provide the victims with 
adequate tangible support, let alone making sure that displaced people were able 
to return to their homes, that victims were provided with opportunities to gain 
vocational skills or find employment, that their children were educated, or that 
they received financial support or social services. 
Displaced people, conflict victims with special needs, and disabled ex-
combatants have all expressed dissatisfaction with the support they have received. 
Indra Prasad Yadav from Banke District, who lost a leg during the insurgency, 
was pleased to have been provided with an artificial limb, but he complained 
that the NPTF had not provided any effective rehabilitation (interview at 
Hawaldarpur, Banke District, July 30, 2013). It is not only the victims who have 
complained about this inadequate provision, government officials, including 
implementing partners, have accepted that there have been shortcomings. The 
program coordinator of the National Disabled Fund (NDF) explained that the 
list of conflict victims provided by the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction 
was flawed (interview, July 15, 2014). Furthermore, he admitted that “internally 
displaced people found the relief package very unattractive because they were 
only entitled to physiotherapy services and minor treatments. In part, their 
complaints stemmed from the fact that those people travelling from remote areas 
had to spend more money to travel to the rehabilitation center than they received 
in support.” Meanwhile, Arjun Kunwar, Laddan Jaga, and Hira Budathoki 
expressed satisfaction with the artificial legs and hands they received at the 
rehabilitation centers (interviews July 30, 2013, Banke District). Laddan said that 
the artificial limb was too expensive and he could not afford it, but he got support 
from the NPTF project. But by the end of 2014, only 350 people out of a total of 
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2,750 amputees had received artificial limbs or other aids (NPTF 2014).
There are various reasons for the NPTF’s failure to provide adequate support 
for conflict victims. The main challenge in this area was the difficulty identifying 
genuine victims, followed by difficulties in reaching them. In 2007, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction drew up a list of 
around four thousand disabled victims of the conflict (Advocacy Forum 2010; 
Nepal Monitor 2011). However, a secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister and 
the Council of Ministers stated that new names were added to the list with every 
change of government and the list was modified several times in the subsequent 
six years (interview at Prime Minister’s Office, Kathmandu, July 22, 2013). This 
official further admitted that around 75 percent of those on the list were not 
genuine victims. During a field visit in 2015, two conflict victims, whose names 
were not listed, said that political party cadres wanted their names on the list so 
that they could obtain benefits from the state, while the names of genuine victims 
were omitted. The NPTF’s work was made very difficult by such unreliable data. 
A senior political journalist on the national daily, Kantipur, who was covering the 
peace process, suggested that the NPTF could have updated the list with genuine 
victims but failed to do so (interview, July 26, 2014). In an IDA survey (2013) of 
conflict victims, 53 percent of respondents thought that victims with disabilities 
were being denied access to rehabilitation services due to their lack of political 
connections. As many as 67 percent of beneficiaries did not receive any benefits 
until after 2012. This evidence from interviewees indicates that the NPTF failed 
to rehabilitate conflict victims effectively.
Delays in Transitional Justice
Transitional justice, peace, and security are all very important for a post-conflict 
country. But in Nepal, the national and local reconciliation process has lagged 
behind other areas of post-conflict work for almost a decade. As a member 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission complained, “The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was established eight years after the peace agreement, 
and even now the government is not willing to offer the commission genuine 
support. They are delaying the adoption of rules and by-laws for the commission 
without which it cannot operate” (interview, November 10, 2015, Kathmandu). 
Even though transitional justice is supposed to be the third important theme of 
the NPTF framework, civil society leaders and journalists that I interviewed in 
2014 and 2015 were unaware of any support for transitional justice provided by 
the NPTF. Although there is no evidence of the NPTF engaging in any activity 
directly related to transitional justice, NPTF documents show that it has allocated 
financial resources to this area. The project lists on the NPTF website indicate 
that the fund’s major priorities are the reconstruction of police posts and the 
provision of training related to peace and security. According to recent data, 
total investment in this cluster up to 2013 amounted to NPR3,947.83 million, 
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comprising about 17 percent of the total NPTF budget (NPTF 2014). Of the 
768 police posts destroyed during the armed conflict, a total of 249 are being 
reconstructed by the Nepal Police with the support of the NPTF. The NPTF also 
supported a UN Mine Action program. These are the only two relatively effective 
programs in this area.
One claim that is often heard is that the NPTF could not support transitional 
justice mechanisms because no such entities were in existence until 2014. 
Two commissions, namely, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Commission on Investigating Disappeared Persons, were formed in late 2014. But 
these two commissions are still struggling to function properly due to the lack 
of clear support from the government and the major political parties. Therefore, 
it is impossible to evaluate the contribution of the NPTF to transitional justice, 
although it is possible to examine the NPTF’s efforts to improve security in rural 
areas by supporting the reconstruction of police posts. One can argue that the 
NPTF framework achieved considerable success in the reconstruction of police 
posts in various locations. This has helped to reestablish a police presence in 
remote areas and improved the performance of the Nepal police, contributing 
to an increased sense of security among the population and improved access to 
state security institutions. One ex-combatant in a remote village in Dang District 
confirmed this, saying, “We village people are quite happy and we feel secure as 
the police post here in our village was restored after fifteen years and the support 
from the NPTF is praiseworthy” (interview, July 17, 2015, Fulbari Village, Dang 
District).
 Almost all the interviewees criticized the weaknesses in the area of 
transitional justice. It seems that this issue has been totally overshadowed by 
the constitution-drafting process and other major changes in the country. The 
relevant authorities have almost forgotten to address the issues of impunity, 
justice, and reconciliation for national healing. Work has now started on 
transitional justice, over a decade after the start of the peace process, though 
progress is still slow and contested. Nevertheless, interviewees, including the 
secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, the editor of a major national daily in 
Kathmandu, and former combatants, all expressed admiration for the NPTF’s 
involvement in reconstructing police posts in different parts of the country. They 
felt that this work was also necessary for peace, although it was not as important 
as transitional justice.
Disputes over the Drafting of the Constitution and the Restructuring of the State 
The constitution-drafting process and state restructuring have been at the center 
of Nepali politics since the peace process started. Though the formal constitution-
drafting process was started in Nepal after the first Constituent Assembly election 
in 2009, there had already been many disputes and a great deal of turmoil and 
political drama in the name of constitution drafting and state restructuring since 
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the successful conclusion of the popular movement in 2006 and especially after 
the adoption of the interim constitution in 2007. Though the first Constituent 
Assembly failed to promulgate a new constitution, the electoral and parliamentary 
process was relatively successful in preventing overt violence for a long period 
of time. The NPTF played a crucial supportive role in the success of the first 
elections for the Constituent Assembly. Besides supporting the electoral process, 
the NPTF helped the Constituent Assembly Secretariat (CAS) to consolidate 
public opinion to facilitate the drafting of a new constitution (NPTF 2014). In 
this area, the NPTF assisted with elections to the Constituent Assembly and other 
bodies, setting up polling centers and carrying out voter education. The NPTF 
Programme Document (2010a) claims that this support played an important 
role in ensuring that the elections were relatively free and fair. The NPTF was 
supposed to support the democratization process by facilitating national and 
local elections, but as it turned out, only national elections took place. After 
the failure of the first Constituent Assembly, the NPTF supported elections for 
the second assembly in 2013. The elections and the formation of that body put 
a heavy financial burden on both the government of Nepal and the NPTF. The 
expenditure on this cluster totaled NPR12,155.20 million, or 54 percent of the 
total budget, making it the largest of all the four areas of the NPTF’s expenditure 
(NPTF 2014). The huge spending in this area often raises the question of cost 
effectiveness and the “just” distribution of resources. Other major components 
of the peace process, such as help for conflict victims, transitional justice, and 
national healing and reconciliation, were neglected in favor of huge expenditure 
on the electoral process. 
According to the project summary, the bulk of the money was spent on the 
voter education program, the purchase of stationery and other materials required 
for holding elections, security expenses incurred by the Election Commission, 
and daily and travel allowances for commission officials. The allowance paid to 
officials during the election period was controversial, with the national media 
criticizing the massive expenditure on allowances (Republica 2013; Election 
Commission Nepal 2014; Nepal Press Bulletin 2013). A joint secretary of the 
Election Commission of Nepal reported thus: “One area in which the NPTF was 
successful was voter registration, with the electoral register being updated and 
made electronic” (interview, at Election Commission Office, Kathmandu, July 
22, 2014). According to some civil society representatives, although the Election 
Commission did not succeed in issuing voter identity cards, at least the electronic 
registration process helped ensure that elections were free and fair (interview 
with former member of the National Human Rights Commission, Kathmandu, 
October 10, 2014). A lot of NPTF funds were spent on election-related activities, 
but many people perceived this investment to be less effective than expected 
(interview with senior journalist on Kantipur national daily, July 26, 2014). 
Although the purpose of election-related projects was to contribute to democracy 
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by ensuring free and fair elections, in some senses it may be said that the money 
was misspent.
Besides the national elections, the NPTF also supported many peace-related 
dialogues at national and local level (NPTF 2014). The NPTF provided logistical 
and financial support for most of the peace dialogues among the major political 
parties, or between the government and opposition groups and small armed 
groups, plus other dialogues which were conducted by the Ministry of Peace and 
Reconstruction. The NPTF secretariat also made its office available as a venue for 
many dialogues (interviews with a secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and 
the director of the NPTF, July 22, 2013, Kathmandu). The secretary of the Kailali 
District Peace Committee and the chair of the Rukum District Peace Committee 
said that the support of the NPTF did at least help the local peace committees 
expand to village level, but it was not enough to cover the administrative costs 
of the office or the cost of organizing various activities at local level (interviews, 
April 14, 2013, and December 19, 2014).
NPTF Governing Modality: Isolation from the Political Process
The extension of the peace process beyond the stipulated six months to six years 
required additional investment which, although it brought added developmental 
benefits, also created an environment that was conducive to corruption. The 
Nepalese peace process is seen as being basically home grown because it was 
led by national leaders and driven by their decisions, with the support of the 
international community (Grävingholt et al. 2013). The NPTF is a model for 
this kind of process as it allowed for the involvement of political leaders, donors, 
and government bureaucrats in decision making. Both the government and 
donors have contributed to the fund. Implementing the CPA would have been a 
challenging task even in the best of times. Though the mandate and operations of 
the NPTF have largely depended on the willingness of political decision makers 
to provide a framework within which the NPTF can coordinate and implement its 
projects, the NPTF structure involves not only political players from Nepal, but 
also donors, government bureaucrats, and consultants hired by the NPTF itself. 
This creates some very interesting dynamics. From the very beginning, political 
actors were at the core of this structure. They are the key decision makers, but 
their role is often limited to “witnessing” the process and signing off decisions, 
and most of the time they are isolated from the decision-making process because 
of the political bureaucracy of the donors and the interests of the bureaucrats 
running the NPTF. 
According to the NPTF’s director, it has succeeded in creating a basket fund 
to pool money from the government and eight major donors (interview, July 22, 
2013, Kathmandu). The director further explained how the fund had mobilized 
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resources through various line ministries to implement projects in different 
areas. The establishment of the NPTF mechanism reflects the way that both 
government and donors have prioritized working together to bring the peace 
process to a logical conclusion. According to its Programme Document (2010a), 
the NPTF has adopted a two-stage approach to translating its mandate into 
practical operations: first, the NPTF Board sets the priorities for its work based 
on an analysis of peacebuilding needs and an assessment of what can be agreed 
upon and carried out by the NPTF. Second, within the framework provided 
by the board, the NPTF uses a demand-oriented approach to identify specific 
projects. But despite what is stated in this document, the NPTF has never been 
demand oriented. Often, the demands came from government offices, or the 
technical committee might approach government offices and suggest that they 
submit a concept note or demands (interviews with implementing partners of the 
NPTF, including chief administrator, Nepalgunj Physical Rehabilitation Center, 
July 30, 2013; head of program, Nepal Electricity Authority Surkhet Office, 
August 2, 2013; and an architect in the Urban Planning Division, Kathmandu). 
The implementing partners gave the impression that NPTF decision making was 
mostly dominated by bureaucrats. Furthermore, the NPTF channeled its budget 
primarily through government bodies, selecting its implementing partners from 
among state actors. Thus, the NPTF was not responding to demands from its 
potential beneficiaries but was rather operating on the basis of needs identified by 
government bureaucrats. And initially, most of its projects were both identified 
and executed by government bureaucrats to serve their own interests. In the 
second phase, however, it was opened to non-state actors on a pilot basis. But 
because of the unwillingness of government bureaucrats and political leaders, 
NGOs are no longer part of the NPTF framework, or if they are involved, they are 
limited to small projects within a restricted area. 
According to one official, “there was continuous debate over whether 
to include state actors only or both state and non-state actors in project 
implementation. Only seven projects were given to national NGOs as pilot 
projects” (interview with secretary, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, 
September 10, 2015, Kathmandu). Most of the time, government bureaucrats were 
suspicious of the activities of NGOs in Nepal (interview with member of NGO 
Federation of Nepal Central Committee, September 7, 2014). Donors complained 
of slow and inefficient implementation by government actors (interview with 
a technical advisor to the NPTF from the donors’ side, June 26, 2013, NPTF 
Secretariat). The debates and clash of priorities arose because the NPTF is a 
joint initiative of government and donors, and the two sides have very different 
working patterns. The majority of government officials interviewed by the author 
found the implementation arrangements unusual and unfamiliar (semi-structured 
interviews with under-secretary and joint secretary of NPTF, June 26, 2013, 
NPTF Secretariat, Kathmandu). The NPTF is only a coordinating mechanism and 
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does not have its own institutional arrangements for implementing projects. It is 
evident that it has to rely on other government agencies and civil servants. Local 
government officials in Nepal were already overburdened due to the absence of 
local elected bodies. The secretary of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction 
said that local officials had to take on NPTF projects in addition to their regular 
government workload, and they tended to feel less responsibility for them 
(interview, September 10, 2015). 
Another recurring grievance raised by government bureaucrats was that even 
though most of the NPTF funds (almost 60 percent) come from the government, 
the government’s voice is not sufficiently heard and it is not accorded sufficient 
“dignity.” Both the government bureaucrats and politicians said they felt that the 
NPTF was dominated by donors (semi-structured interviews with secretary, joint 
secretary, and under-secretary, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, September 
10, 2015, June 26, 2013, at their offices in Kathmandu). Representatives of 
political parties also felt that the NPTF was dominated by donor representatives, 
peace experts, and the NPTF’s own bureaucrats. The political leaders shared the 
feeling that they were often treated as “passive witnesses” (sakshi kinara ma basne 
in Nepali) in the NPTF by both the fund’s bureaucrats and donors (interview with 
former minister of peace and reconstruction, August 24, 2013, at her residence). 
According to the former minister of peace and reconstruction, when it came to 
approving programs, officials generally handed her thick reports on the day of the 
meeting and asked her to make a decision. She felt that she had not been given 
sufficient time to digest the reports and give her opinions.
Another issue regarding the NPTF’s governing modality concerns 
reconstruction. Although reconstruction was a cross-cutting theme of all the 
projects, the NPTF spent very little money on it. Despite a focus on infrastructure, 
in practice, very few projects were undertaken (NPTF 2014). Political leaders and 
government officials felt that donors did not trust them and tended to bristle at 
unnecessary policy interventions (interviews with secretary, minister, and officials 
from the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction). Investment priorities associated 
with reconstruction were an issue of constant debate. The majority of government 
officials wanted to invest in infrastructure and construction projects which they 
considered to be of the highest priority. Donors, on the other hand, prioritized 
activities such as skills development, capacity building, and counseling. Despite 
the intense debate, investment in both areas—infrastructure reconstruction and 
skills development—has been weak throughout the history of the NPTF.
Flawed arrangements for the procurement of goods also constituted a 
major issue in the initial phase. “The government had suspended the Public 
Procurement Act to expedite purchases. This had the effect of creating 
opportunities for corrupt officials and leaders” a senior journalist on the Kantipur 
newspaper stated. Because of the special provisions, those implementing the 
projects did not need to follow normal procurement processes. This speeded up 
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procurement but facilitated corruption. In the initial phase, it is reported that 
government agencies did not even keep records of what was bought and from 
where it was bought. 
Conclusion
The NPTF is a localized case of a unique model which may have far-reaching 
international implications. The author concludes that the process has produced 
mixed results. On the whole it has made a significant contribution to the 
conclusion of the peace process in Nepal in a very difficult environment, although 
the majority of NPTF projects had only mediocre outcomes.
A decade after the establishment of the NPTF, there are still a lot of issues 
that need to be addressed if a sustainable peace is to be achieved, even though 
the government and some other actors claim that the peace process has reached 
its logical conclusion. The NPTF framework and the peace process as a whole 
has missed the opportunity to carry out “national healing.”  The political process 
has always been focused on the center, and the peace process has not impacted 
on local life. Families of the disappeared are still suffering; legal obstacles are 
hampering the resolution of property and other family matters, as the issue 
of the disappearances has yet to be legally addressed. It is claimed that many 
genuine victims of the conflict were omitted from the official list, whereas others 
were included on false pretenses and are enjoying allowances and benefits to 
which they are not entitled. The majority of ex-combatants did not return to 
their homes but settled in semi-urban settings, and now they are often having to 
cope with various psychosocial challenges. In all these cases, “reconciliation and 
healing” has been absent. Ex-combatants were sent back to society without any 
counseling or preparation; conflict victims are living very difficult lives, lacking 
even the barest necessities. More than that, the issue of transitional justice has 
still not been addressed, meaning that people at the grass roots are suffering every 
day, something which is ignored by national politicians. From one point of view, 
the peace process seems to be almost complete and the NPTF is wrapping up its 
projects. But dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of the process is warning us 
that there is the possibility of another conflict in the future. 
Notes
This paper was presented at the conference “Post-War Development in Asia and Africa,” 
organized by CEPA, September 1–3, 2014. I would like to acknowledge the contribution of 
anonymous reviewers, and my friends Surabhi Pudasaini, Sakar Pudasaini, and Chiranjibi 
Bhandari for assistance with revision. 
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